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Climate change is a major concern for financial policymakers. To this day, banks
continue to plough money into carbon-intensive sectors of the economy while
making inadequate provisions for potential losses. The European Central Bank’s
2020 draft Guide on climate-related and environmental risks is a major step in
supervisory efforts to address this problem, which so far has escaped critical
scrutiny. It sets out how the ECB will use its supervisory powers to get banks to
properly monitor, disclose and price risk. As we argue, its current approach is
unlikely to work because it asks banks to quantify risks that often resist simple
quantification. Instead, the ECB should provide banks with more targeted guidance.
That will make banking supervision more political than it is today.
Climate change as a threat to financial stability
In May, the ECB published a draft Guide as part of a public consultation on the
climate currently underway, which is meant to inform banking supervision in the
coming years. With a group of scholars in law, political economy and philosophy
we discussed the Guide to contribute to the consultation. Our submission to the
consultation itself is available here. In this blog we set out our personal takeaways
from that process and the perspective it provides on a future of climate-sensitive EU
banking supervision.
Banks are currently exposed to large future financial risks as a consequence
of climate change. For one, increasingly ambitious mitigation efforts will require
replacing carbon intensive infrastructure, reducing productive capacity and even
giving up on whole sectors of the economy. Further, extreme weather events
threaten coastal real estate and a changing climate will have a major impact on
agriculture. Financial risk resulting from economic policies to prevent climate change
is generally referred to as transition risk, while potential losses from climate change
itself as physical risk.
 Why do these risks matter? As long as banks ignore climate risks they will invest in
projects that lock in emissions for decades to come. To date, billions of European
loans serve to fund coal-based energy production. What tends to worry the financial
sector policy-makers, however, is not the resulting emissions necessarily. Rather,
what they care about is that risk is adequately priced. Having learnt about systemic
repercussions in 2008, central bankers consider climate change a threat to financial
stability.
 To date, policy-makers have taken an incremental approach to greening the banking
system. Working within the already immense regulatory framework, they seek to
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ensure that banks accurately monitor risk, hold capital so as to offset potential losses
and disclose risk they take to their investors. New regulations such as the revised
Capital Requirement Regulation seek to incorporate climate-related risks into the
banks’ risk buffers. To improve disclosure to investors, the Sustainable Disclosures
Regulation and the Taxonomy Regulation create a framework to increase the
transparency of banks’ balance sheets and how they are doing on climate and
environmental protection. These efforts target both investors who are sustainability-
conscious and those who focus on maximizing returns.
The ECB’s new Guide
The ECB’s new Draft Guide brings this incremental approach to bear on banking
supervision. The Guide will inform SSM banking supervision of 114 banks in the
Banking Union (plus 13 in Bulgaria and Croatia, which have joined in October 2020).
It will also serve as an important reference point for other supervisors.
The Guide consists of 13 expectations that concern, inter alia, the bank’s business
strategy, management expertise and incentive structures, as well as the disclosure
of risk to investors. By formulating expectations on these issues, the ECB tells banks
how supervisors will from now on interpret already existing legal requirements.
Making climate risk a part of the supervisory process also serves to “enhance
the industry’s awareness of and preparedness for managing climate-related and
environmental risks”. That is not yet the case.
Going forward, the supervisors hope, adequate risk management practices will
become more widespread, but to date no single approach is even close to becoming
an industry standard. As it stands, the ECB observes that
only a small number of institutions have fully incorporated climate-related
and environmental risks into their risk management framework, through
for instance a risk measurement approach, by defining their risk appetite,
performing stress tests and scenario analyses and/or assessing the impact
on their capital adequacy. 
Hence, a key expectation is that banks should
incorporate climate-related and environmental risks as drivers of
established risk categories into their existing risk management framework,
with a view to managing and monitoring these over a sufficiently long-term
horizon, and to review their arrangements on a regular basis.
How are banks going to get there? The ECB Guide asks banks to innovate and
develop their own risk modelling strategies for climate risk. To provide banks with
inspiration, the Guide lists best practices observed in the handful of banks already
working on greening their risk management. But otherwise the Guide is mostly
silent on what banks should do. Such trust in bank self-regulation seems inspired
by the legacy of the 1990s, when private institutions developed their innovative
internal risk management methodologies (in particular, Value at Risk as developed
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by JP Morgan), which were subsequently incorporated into the 1996 Market Risk
Amendment and formed the basis for the Basel II Capital Accord.
Back to the 90s?
Will betting once more on self-regulation allow the ECB to put European banking
system on a sustainable trajectory? We predict that the ECB’s gambit will not pay off.
For one, the Guide relies predominantly on bank internal modelling and supervisory
expectations, without providing for specific corrective action which may be taken by
the supervisor. The short-term business incentive of banks is to underestimate risk
and thereby keep their cost of capital low. The Guide, in contrast to these market
imperatives, remains a soft law instrument which seeks to guide, rather than to
enforce. As the ECB puts it, the Guide is “not binding for the institutions, but rather
it serves as a basis for supervisory dialogue”. Hence, banks are likely to seek to
formally align with the expectations for reputational reasons or pre-empt regulatory
action. They will not fundamentally change their lending behaviour.
The current approach also risks undermining the level-playing field within the EU’s
banking sector. Where large banks may have the capacity to formally align and “look
busy” developing new models and running stress tests, it is difficult to see smaller
institutions do so. There is in fact a long history of large banks using hefty EU-level
compliance costs to get rid of smaller domestic competitors. Complying will be most
difficult for banks in Member States where, for example due to present energy mixes,
the transition requires substantial reorganisation of the economy in order to meet the
Paris Agreement targets. This will again put pressure on the Single Market.
We also see a bigger risk in the ECB’s gambit, which concerns the technical
feasibility of assigning probabilities to climate risk. Instead of looking towards the
future, banks’ internal risk models use historical default rates to estimate future
potential losses. Based on financial indicators and observed default frequencies,
the models make quantitative predictions of potential losses. However, such
backward-looking methodologies ignore risk that has not historically occurred; like
the proverbial black swan, climate change will result in historically unprecedented
green swan events. Carbon-based energy production has historically tended to
produce high and reliable profits. Extreme weather events, by their nature, are at
the extremes of historical observations. As the Guide points out, climate-related
and environmental risk will depend on factors such as, inter alia, “macroeconomic
variables, the competitive landscape, policy and regulation, technology, societal/
demographic developments, and geopolitical trends”. Where so many factors are
unknown, the situation is one of Keynesian fundamental uncertainty: There is just not
enough evidence to assign a probability distribution to future outcomes.
Preparing for the future
If the ECB’s gambit fails, then what should regulators do?  The solution is clear,
but not simple. Instead of merely asking banks to anticipate mitigation trajectories
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and estimate potential losses themselves, supervisors should take on a much
more active role. They will need to provide banks with environmentally-calibrated
modelling tools and set parameters, based on reference scenarios for (i) the physical
effects of climate change; and (ii) the structural transformations of the economy that
governments that banks should anticipate. Setting out the future that banks should
anticipate will give teeth to regulatory guidance, safeguard a level-playing field and
take away the need for banks to navigate the present uncertainty alone.
That route, however, is not simple since it will quickly confront supervisors with
important political questions. Reference scenarios for physical risks can be based
on the relevant climate science, but spelling out what these require for banks is not
straightforward. Even more sensitive politically: Scenarios for the transition require
drawing on and anticipating the evolving climate change mitigation policies on the
EU and Member State level. Spelling out the direction and the pace of changes that
banks should anticipate will unavoidably shape the transformations of the economy
itself, for example by influencing the cost of credit for specific activities.
Greening the banking system, hence, raises new questions concerning the proper
mandate of the ECB and its accountability structures – we can only scratch the
surface of these topics here. For now, greening the financial system could be
justified through the lens of financial stability but also by invoking overarching
sustainability-related goals of EU Treaties (in particular Art. 11 TEU, which requires
that environmental protection be integrated in the definition and implementation of
EU policies by the Union’s institutions).
Eventually, tackling climate risk will require rethinking the broader public role of
banking supervisors. Although creative reinterpretation of existing legal frameworks
has been the lifeblood of central banking since the Great Financial Crisis, new
political challenges require going beyond this approach. First, to make limited, but
ultimately crucial, choices in supervising climate risk banking supervisors need clear
democratic authorization. There are ample legislative tools within the EU political
framework for this. Improved guidance on the ECB’s mandate must also be coupled
with an adjustment of its ex ante and ex post accountability mechanisms. The design
of reference scenarios should ideally involve both democratic representation at
the EU level as well as stakeholder involvement – not just those from the financial
system, but also representatives of citizens, businesses and workers.
If supervisors are to set out the future that banks should anticipate, their role will
unavoidably become more political. This is the future for which they need to prepare.
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